Abstract-Unicast communication over a network of M parallel relays in the presence of an eavesdropper is considered. The relay nodes, operating under individual power constraints, amplify and forward the signals received at their inputs. In this scenario, the problem of the maximum secrecy rate achievable with AF relaying is addressed. Previous work on this problem provides iterative algorithms based on semidefinite relaxation. However, those algorithms result in suboptimal performance without any performance and convergence guarantees. We address this problem for two specific network models: (a) degraded eavesdropper channel with complex channel gain and (b) scaled eavesdropper channel with real-valued channel gains. For the first problem, we propose a novel transformation that leads to the global optimum. Our analysis leads to a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal secure AF rate for the other scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication, by its inherent broadcast nature, is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate receivers within communication range of the source. Wyner in [1] , for the first time, information-theoretically addressed the problem of secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper and showed that secure communication is possible if the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the destination channel. The rate at which information can be transferred from the source to the intended destination while ensuring complete equivocation at the eavesdropper is termed as secrecy rate and its maximum over all input probability distributions is defined as the secrecy capacity of channel. Later, [2] extended Wyner's result to Gaussian channels. These results are further extended to various models such as multi-antenna systems [3] , [4] , multiuser scenarios [5] , [6] , fading channels [7] , [8] .
An interesting direction of work on secure communication in the presence of eavesdropper(s) is one in which the source communicates with the destination via relay nodes [9] - [12] . Such work has considered various scenarios such as different relaying schemes (amplify-and-forward and decodeand-forward), constraints on total or individual relay power consumption, one or more eavesdroppers. However, tight characterization of secrecy capacity or even optimal achievable rate is not available except for a few specific scenarios.
We consider unicast communication over a network of M parallel relays in the presence of an eavesdropper. The relay nodes, operating under individual power constraints, amplify and forward signals received at their inputs. The objective is to maximize the rate of secure transmission from the source to the destination by choosing the optimal set of scaling factors for the AF-relays. In general, the problem is non-convex and global optima cannot be guaranteed. However, we establish that convexification of the constraint is possible for the degraded eavesdropper channels scenario, where each relay to destination channel gain is larger than the corresponding relay to eavesdropper channel gain. Though such a scenario is limited, we argue that it may still provide insights into the nature of the optimal solution for the general problem and help us construct low-complexity capacity-achieving schemes. Later, we discuss a special scenario: scaled eavesdropper channels and provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal secure AF rate.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose an optimization formulation that leads to the global optimum for the degraded channel scenario. Previously, the problem addressed in this paper was also considered for the general channel scenario in [11] for a single eavesdropper and [12] for multiple eavesdroppers. However, the semidefinite relaxation based approaches proposed therein only provide suboptimal performance without any guarantee on the performance (even for simple network models) and the convergence of the proposed iterative algorithms. Unlike such previous work, we propose a novel variable transformation that results in convexification of the constraint for the degraded channel scenario.
Our main contributions are as follows:
‚ For the degraded eavesdropper channel model, we propose a novel transformation for the non-convex problem and present an approach to compute the optimal secrecy rate achievable with AF relaying. ‚ We then provide a lower-bound to the optimal rate based on the zero-forcing approach and an upper bound based on the total relay power constraint. ‚ For the network model with scaled eavesdropper channels, motivated by the greedy approaches proposed in [13] , [14] to compute the optimal AF rate over diamond networks, we propose a novel efficient scheme to compute the optimal secrecy rate achievable with AF relaying.
This paper provides some of the key results of our work. Various extensions and detailed discussions can be found in our ArXiv submission [15] . Organization: Section II introduces the system model and notation. In Section III, we analyze the optimal AF secrecy rate for two specific network models. The performance of the proposed approaches is evaluated in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Consider the Gaussian "diamond" or parallel M relay network as depicted in Figure 1 . The source node s transmits a message to the destination t with the help of M parallel relays. However, the signals transmitted by the relays for the destination are also overheard by the eavesdropper e. The channel inputs at time n P N at the source s and the i th relay are denoted by x s rns and x i rns, respectively. The channel outputs at time n P N at the destination t, the eavesdropper e, and the i th relay are denoted by y t rns, y e rns, and y i rns. These channel inputs and outputs are related as:
where pz i rnsq i,n , pz t rnsq n , and pz e rnsq n are independent and identically distributed (iid) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ 2 , independent of channel inputs. The channel gains ph si q M i"1 , ph it q M i"1 , and ph ie q M i"1 are complex numbers, constant over time [14] , [16] and known (even for the eavesdropper channels) throughout the network [10] - [12] .
In amplify-and-forward relaying, each relay scales its received signal before transmitting. The maximum scaling factor at a relay is determined by its individual power constraint. We consider the following average transmit power constraint: Er|x i rns| 2 s ď P i ,´8 ă n ă 8, i P ts, 1, 2, . . . , M u Therefore, the channel input at the i th relay can be written as:
where the scaling factor β is subject to the constraint β P B, B :"
Assuming equal delay along each path, for the network in Figure 1 , the copies of the source signal (x s r.s) and noise signals (z i r.s), respectively, arrive at the destination and the eavesdropper along multiple paths of the same delay. Therefore, the signals received at the destination and eavesdropper are free from intersymbol interference (ISI). Thus, we can omit the time indices and use equations (1)-(3) to write:
The secrecy rate at the destination for such a network model can be written as [1] , R s pP s q " rIpx s ; y t q´Ipx s ; y e qs`, where Ipx s ; yq represents the mutual information between random variable x s and y and rus`" maxtu, 0u. The secrecy capacity is attained for Gaussian channels with the Gaussian input x s " CN p0, P s q, where Er|x s | 2 s " P s , [2] . Therefore, the optimal secrecy rate achievable with AF relaying can be written as the following optimization problem.
Rs pP s q " max βPB rR t pP s , βq´R e pP s , βqs
where SN R k pP s , βq is calculated from Eq. (5) and can be written as SN R k pP s , βq " γ s Γ k pβq, k P tt, eu with
, and
sq is a MˆM diagonal matrix with diagonal entries written in vector form. : denotes the conjugate transpose of a complex vector.
In the following section, we analyze the optimal secure AF rate problem in (6) for two specific network models.
III. OPTIMAL AF SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
We discuss the optimal solution to the maximum AF secrecy rate problem (6) in the M -relay diamond network with single eavesdropper in degraded eavesdropper channels scenario. Later we consider the special case: scaled eavesdropper channels scenario for real channel gain only.
A. Degraded Eavesdropper Channels
At first, we will consider the real channel gain scenario and then we will use the techniques developed for real channel gains to address the complex channel gain scenario.
Consider a real channel model where gains along the source to relays and relays to the destination channels may take arbitrary values. However, the relay to eavesdropper channels are degraded versions of the relay to destination channels, that is,
1) Optimal secrecy rate for individual relay constraints: In this section, we propose an approach to obtain optimal β for a fixed P s . For notational simplicity, we drop the term P s from SN R k p.q. From equation (6), we can rewrite an equivalent optimization problem in the following manner:
The optimization problem (8) can be solved in two steps. At first, we fix an η and solve the inner optimization problem (maximize SN R t pβq) for optimal β (a function of η), then we address the outer optimization problem involving the variable η.
We perform the following transformation on the non-convex constraints of problem (8) to convert them into a convex one.
, where ω i " h it β i . The objective function for the inner optimization problem, i.e., SN R t pβq becomes v T h s h s T v, where h s " rh s1 , h s2 , . . . , h sM s T . We argue that it suffices to maximize the linear objective h s T v and reformulate the inner optimization problem as:
where C e pηq " 
The equivalence between objective functions of problem (8) and (9) is apparent when h s T v ą 0. As both v and´v result in same pair of values for constraints (9b) and (9c), we can limit the search space to only those v for which h s T v ą 0 is satisfied.
Though Eq. (9b) is relaxed version of the original constraint, but the equality will be restored during the outer optimization problem. For the degraded channels ρ i ă 1; so C e pηq is a positive semidefinite matrix. As the objective function is linear and constraints are convex, so the problem in (9) is convex and can be solved optimally using well-known numerical techniques, e.g., interior-point methods.
After solving the problem (9), we calculate the corresponding η˚P r0, ηs that satisfies Eq. (9b) with equality. Now, the outer optimization reduces to a one dimensional optimization problem (in η) which can be solved by line search as suggested in [11] , [12] . We can limit the range of η by further analysis.
Range of η: As SNR is always positive, so η " 0 serves as a lower bound. This η value corresponds to the zeroforcing solution (III-A3) which serves as a lower bound for optimization problem (8) . For an upper bound on η, we solve the following optimization problem:
The constraint considered here is the total power constraint and corresponds to a larger feasible solution space as compared to individual constraints. Therefore, η max calculated here is an overestimate of the maximum value of η with individual constraints. The solution to this problem is η max " (9) is non-decreasing in η. This is true as feasible set corresponding to (9b) increases with η. This can be easily verified from the following equations: when
The approach discussed in this section is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Degraded Eavesdropper Channel
Calculate C e pηq.
4:
Solve optimization problem (9) to find optimal v˚.
5:
From v˚calculate η˚and ; For practical purposes the consecutive values of η can be chosen using golden-section search and convergence criteria can be set based on the difference between the consecutive objective function values.
Along with the solution to the optimal AF secrecy rate in this setting, we also provide upper and lower bounds on the optimal rate. For the upper bound, we replace the individual power constraint on each relay by a single total power constraint on the β vector. For the lower bound, we consider the zero forcing solution [10] , [12] , where β values are chosen such that the transmitted signals get canceled at the eavesdropper.
2) Optimal secrecy rate for the total power constraint: From equation (6) the total power constraint optimization problem can be expressed in the following manner:
subject to: SN R e pβq " η,
One can check that the total power constraint (10c) results in larger feasible solution space as compared to (4) . Therefore, the optimal objective function value obtained will provide an upper bound to the original individual constraint problem (8) . Using the transformation described previously, we can reformulate the optimization problem in the following manner:
where
q. As D T is a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal elements, so (11c) is a convex constraint. Please refer to the arguments provided after problem (9) to identify the equivalence between problem (10) and (11) . This problem can be solved in a manner similar to the one for the individual power constraint.
Extension to complex channel gain scenario: The variable transformation proposed in Sec. III-A1 is valid for complex variables also, but instead of transpose (T ), we have to use conjugate transpose (:). Also, due to complex variables, we should use absolute values whenever required-now the degraded channel criteria should be |ρ i | ă 1. Unlike the real channel gain scenario, in this case, the objective function of inner optimization problem (SN R t pβq) can not be represented as a linear function. Therefore, it will remain in its quadratic form, i.e., v : h s h : s v. As this objective function and the constraints are convex, so the optimization problem with complex variables (corresponding to Problem (9)) is a concave minimization problem and we can obtain the global optimum using numerical routines as suggested by [17] or by formulating an SOCP as described in [18] . Note that the complex QCQP mentioned above can be converted into a real QCQP as suggested in [20] , where a complex MˆM PSD matrix translates into a real 2Mˆ2M PSD matrix.
After solving the inner optimization problem, we can use the Algorithm 1 to calculate the global optimum.
3) Zero forcing for individual constraints (η " 0): In this approach, we equate SN R e to zero while maximizing SN R t . By imposing this extra constraint we are reducing the feasible solution space; therefore, the solution obtained will provide a lower bound to the original problem. The optimal secure AF rate problem for this case can be written as:
By introducing a new variable vector w, we reformulate it as the following quadratic program (quadratic objective function and linear constraints). It is well known that if the objective function contains positive definite matrix (here it is an identity matrix), then global optimum can be obtained numerically in polynomial time. The relation between β and w is mentioned in Appendix.
Proposition 1. The problem in (12) is equivalent to the following convex program which can be solved efficiently min w w T w, subject to: Hw " r1 0s T , Gw ď 0.
Proof: In the Appendix. After solving the above problem, the optimum β can be calculated in following manner: βi " wi {ph it wM`1q, where w˚is the solution of the quadratic problem.
Extension to complex channel gain scenario: As η " 0 is a special case, we can use the formulation obtained for general η by changing the constraint corresponding to η value. It is easy to see that the constraint corresponding to (9b) can be written in following way for complex variables and η " 0 case:
e v " 0. This is a linear constraint; hence, the optimization problem can be solved in a manner similar to the one for the individual constraint problem with complex channel gains. Remark 2: As this formulation does not rely on the degradedness assumption, it can be used for general channels also.
B. Scaled Eavesdropper Channels (real channel gain)
Scaled eavesdropper scenario is a special case of the degraded channel scenario. Here, all the elements of vector ρ have the same value, i.e., ρ i " α ă 1, @i P t1, . . . , M u. Therefore, the eavesdropper channel can be expressed as h e " αh t . Though the approach discussed in the last section can be used to solve the optimal AF secrecy rate problem corresponding to this network model, here we propose another scheme that better exploits the corresponding channel properties, thus resulting in a efficient implementation.
As before, we consider the variable ω i " h it β i , its upper bound ω i,max " h it β i,max , and a new parameter g si " b
Ps σ 2 h si , i P t1, 2, . . . , M u. Therefore, for a given vector of scaling factors, β " pβ 1 , . . . , β M q, the achievable AF secrecy rate (in terms of new variable ω) is:
where Ψpωq "´ř
So, in this setting, the problem in (6) is:
In the rest of this subsection, we provide an approach to efficiently compute the optimal solution of the problem in (14) and then summarize it in an algorithm.
Note that a non-zero secrecy rate can be obtained only if α ă 1. Thus, 1 ą 2 . This implies that
is maximized when Ψpωq is maximized. To maximize Ψpωq, we first relax the original problem and formulate the following problem:
Here, r 2 corresponds to relaxed square-sum constraint defined in relation to Eq. (13) . It is easy to prove that the optimal ωprq vector for this problem is equal to ωprq " gs ||gs|| r. By replacing this in the secrecy rate equation (14) along with the sum constraint, we formulate the following optimization problem in r:
Proof: By differentiating the objective function of (16) with respect to r and then it equating to 0, we get the solution. Now, if gs ||gs|| r˚satisfy individual constraints of ω i , then this is the optimal solution; else, we must consider the next step that considers scenarios where the solution obtained using the above method violates any of the ω i 's constraints.
We arrange tω i , @iu according to (14), when solved over it as discussed below, is chosen as the one that results in the optimal solution of (14) over all intervals and the corresponding optimal vector of scaling factors β˚. The correctness of this approach follows from an argument similar to the one in [13 ||g s || r 1 .
pmq,max q m , m P t1, . . . ,M´1u and
Remark 3: If 0ďrďr 1 , then we can obtain the optimal scaling vector using the solutions of (15) and (16) . Consider evaluating (14) over the interval rr The part of the objective function in (15) depending on variables ω pm`1q , . . . , ω pM q can be bounded above as: T . Therefore, we have to find the optimal scaling factor λ m for those variables. Replacing the first m ordered variables by their respective upper bounds and the rest of them by a scaled vector of g s,tpm`1q,¨,pM qu , we obtain the following optimization problem in terms of λ m .
The solution to the above problem can be calculated by solving the following degree-4 polynomial equation:
The coefficients of this equation are all negative except for the first one. Using Descartes' rule of signs there is only one positive root, as there is only one variation in the signs of the coefficients. Given that 0 ă λ m , it is the desired solution.
Note that, as r We summarize the whole procedure in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for Scaled Eavesdropper Channel
Input: α, g s , ω i,max , P , σ Sort ω i and g si according to gsi ωi,max in the descending order. 6: for m " 1 to M´1 do 7: Solve polynomial equation (17) to calculate the λ m . 8: Evaluate ω m using λ m corresponding to interval rr 2 m , r 2 m`1 s starting from first i for which λ i ă w pi`1q,max {g s,pi`1q . Denote that i as i 0 .
9:
end for 10: ω˚" ωm, ωm maximizes the solution of (14) over all ω m , m P ti 0 , . . . , M´1u.
11: end if
Discussion: The solution obtained from the Algorithm 2 exploits the structure of the optimization problem and obtain the global optimum for the non-convex problem (13) . Based on the individual constraints, we first divide the feasible set in M non-overlapping sets. The optimal solution for each of these sets contains two classes of variables: (i) those who have reached their respective upper bounds and (ii) those who are aligned in the direction of their counterpart in vector g s . For the latter one we need to calculate the λ value only.
IV. RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the scheme proposed in subsection III-A, consider a network whose main channel gains are sampled from a Rayleigh distribution with parameter 0.5. The degraded channels for eavesdroppers are obtained by multiplying a factor (" U nif ormr0, 1s) with the relay to destination channel gain. We average the results of 1000 such network instances while plotting the graphs. Fig. 2 . Plot of the optimal secrecy rate (Rs ) versus source power (Ps) for five relay node diamond network using the scheme proposed in subsection III-A.
Here we consider Pr " 5 and σ 2 " 1.
In Figure 2 we plot the variation of the optimal AF secrecy rate with respect to the source power (P s ) for the degraded eavesdropper channels. As both the numerator and denominator in the objective function has summation with constant term, so initially for smaller values of P s , it increases rapidly with P s . As P s grows large, the constant term becomes insignificant compared to the other term. The P s term in numerator and denominator nullify each other, which leads to saturation of the optimal secrecy rate. The zero-forcing lower bound and the total power constraint upper bound are also plotted.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of maximizing the rate of secure unicast transmission over a network of parallel AF relays in the presence of an eavesdropper is considered. Unlike previous work that provides iterative algorithms with suboptimal performance without any performance and convergence guarantees, our work provides a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal secure AF rate for two specific network models. In future, we plan to investigate optimum secrecy rate of general AF networks.
